Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–1769)
Sir William Blackstone

Blackstone was the most well respected English legal scholar in the 1700s. His Commentaries on the Laws of England was published 11 years before the Declaration of Independence. It was first published in America in 1771 and later editions included commentaries by American legal scholars familiar with American law. More copies were sold in the American colonies than in the rest of the British Empire. Blackstone’s Commentaries influenced the Founders, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, Supreme Court and lower court decisions, and legislative debates.

Book 1, Chapter 1: Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals


… The absolute rights of every Englishman, (which … are usually called their liberties,) as they are founded on nature and reason, so they are coeval with our form of government. … The rights … consist in a number of private immunities; which will appear, from what has been premised, to be indeed no other, than either that residuum of natural liberty, which is not required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience; or else those civil privileges, which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the natural liberties so given up by individuals. These therefore were formerly, either by inheritance or purchase, the rights of all mankind; but, in most other countries of the world being now more or less debased and destroyed, they at present may be said to remain, in a peculiar and emphatical manner, the rights of the people of England. And these may be reduced to three principal or primary articles; the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property: because as there is no other known method of compulsion, or abridging man’s natural free will, but by an infringement or diminution of one or other of these important rights, the preservation of these, inviolate, may justly be said to include the preservation of our civil immunities in their largest and most extensive sense.

I. The right of personal security consists in a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation.

1. Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother’s womb. For if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion, or otherwise, killeth it in her womb; or if any one beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not murder, was by the ancient law homicide or manslaughter. But at present it is not looked upon in quite so atrocious a light, though it remains a very heinous misdemeanor. An infant … in the mother’s womb, is supposed in law to be born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a surrender of a copyhold estate, made to it. It may have a guardian assigned to it; and it is enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and to take afterwards by such limitation, as if it were then actually born. And in this point the civil law agrees with ours.

2. A man’s limbs (by which for the present we only understand those members which may be useful to him in fight, and the loss of which only amounts to mayhem by the common law) are also the gift of the wise creator; to enable man to protect himself from external injuries in a state of nature. To these therefore he has a natural inherent right; and they cannot be wantonly destroyed or disabled without a manifest breach of civil liberty.

Both the life and limbs of a man are of such high value, in the estimation of the law of England, that it pardons even homicide if committed … to preserve them. For whatever is done by a man, to save either life or member, is looked upon as done upon the highest necessity and compulsion. Therefore, if a man through fear of death or mayhem is prevailed upon to execute a deed, or do any other legal act; these, though accompanied with all other the requisite solemnities, are totally void in law, if forced upon him by a well-grounded apprehension of losing his life, or even his limbs, in case of his non-cosmpliance. And the same is also a sufficient excuse for the commission of many misdemeanors. …

3. Besides those limbs and members that may be necessary to man, in order to defend himself or annoy his enemy, the rest of his person or body is also entitled by the same natural right to security from the corporal insults of menaces, assaults, beating, and wounding; though such insults amount not to destruction of life or member.

4. The preservation of a man’s health from such practices as may prejudice or annoy it, and

5. The security of his reputation or good name from the arts of detraction and slander, are rights to which every man is entitled, by reason and natural justice; since without these it is impossible to have the perfect enjoyment of any other advantage or right. But these three last articles (being of much less importance than those which have gone before, and those which are yet to come) it will suffice to have barely mentioned among the rights of persons; referring the more minute discussion of their several branches, to those parts of our commentaries which treat of the infringement of these rights, under the head of personal wrongs.

II. Next to personal security, the law of England regards, asserts, and preserves the personal liberty of individuals. This personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one’s person to whatsoever place one’s own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law. Concerning which we may make the same observations as upon the preceding article; that it is a right strictly natural; that the laws of England have never abridged it without sufficient cause; and, that in this kingdom it cannot ever be abridged at the mere discretion of the magistrate, without the explicit permission of the laws. Here again the language of the great charter is, that no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned but by the lawful judgment of his equals, or by the law of the land. And many subsequent old statutes expressly direct, that no man shall be taken or imprisoned … unless it be by legal indictment, or the process of the common law. … No freeman shall be imprisoned or detained without cause shown, to which he may make answer according to law. … If any person be restrained of his liberty by order or decree of any illegal court, or by command of the king’s majesty in person; or by warrant of the council board, or of any of the privy council; he shall, upon demand of his counsel, have a writ of habeas corpus, to bring his body before the court of king’s bench or common pleas, who shall determine whether the cause of his commitment be just, and thereupon do as to justice shall appertain. And by … the habeas corpus act, the methods of obtaining this writ are so plainly pointed out and enforced, that, so long as this statute remains unimpeached, no subject of England can be long detained in prison, except in those cases in which the law requires and justifies such detainer. And,
lest this act should be evaded by demanding unreasonable bail, or
sureties for the prisoner’s appearance, it is declared … that
excessive bail ought not to be required.

Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this
personal liberty; for if once it were left in the power of any, the
highest, magistrate to imprison arbitrarily whomever he or his
officers thought proper, (as in France it is daily practiced by the
crown) there would soon be an end of all other rights and
immunities. Some have thought that unjust attacks, even upon life,
or property, at the arbitrary will of the magistrate, are less
dangerous to the commonwealth than such as are made upon the
personal liberty of the subject. To bereave a man of life, or by
violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation or trial, would
be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as must at once
convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole kingdom. But
confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail, where
his sufferings are unknown or forgotten; is a less public, a less
striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary
government. And yet sometimes, when the state is in real danger,
even this may be a necessary measure. But the happiness of our
constitution is, that it is not left to the executive power to
determine when the danger of the state is so great, as to render
this measure expedient. For the parliament only, or legislative
power, whenever it sees proper, can authorize the crown, by
suspending the habeas corpus act for a short and limited time, to
imprison suspected persons without giving any reason for so
doing, as the senate of Rome was wont to have recourse to a
dictator, a magistrate of absolute authority, when they judged the
republic in any imminent danger. … In like manner this
experiment ought only to be tried in cases of extreme emergency;
and in these the nation parts with its liberty for a while, in order to
preserve it forever.

The confinement of the person, in any wise, is an imprisonment;
so that the keeping a man against his will in a private house,
putting him in the stocks, arresting or forcibly detaining him in
the street, is an imprisonment. And the law so much discourages
unlawful confinement, that if a man is under duress of
imprisonment, which we before explained to mean a compulsion
by an illegal restraint of liberty, until he seals a bond or the like;
he may allege this duress, and avoid the extorted bond. But if a
man be lawfully imprisoned, and either to procure his discharge,
or on any other fair account, seals a bond or a deed, this is not by
duress of imprisonment, and he is not at liberty to avoid it. To
make imprisonment lawful, it must either be, by process from the
courts of judicature, or by warrant from some legal officer having
authority to commit to prison; which warrant must be in writing,
under the hand and seal of the magistrate, and express the causes
of the commitment, in order to be examined into, if necessary,
on a habeas corpus. …

III. The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that
of property: which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and
disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution,
save only by the laws of the land. The original of private property
is probably founded in nature … but certainly the modifications
under which we at present find it, the method of conserving it in
the present owner, and of translating it from man to man, are
entirely derived from society; and are some of those civil
advantages, in exchange for which every individual has resigned a
part of his natural liberty. The laws of England are therefore, in
point of honor and justice, extremely watchful in ascertaining and
protecting this right. Upon this principle the great charter has
declared that no freeman shall be disseized, or divested, of his
freehold, or of his liberties, or free customs, but by the judgment
of his peers, or by the law of the land. And by a variety of ancient
statutes it is enacted, that no man’s lands or goods shall be seized
into the king’s hands, against the great charter, and the law of the
land; and that no man shall be disinherited, nor put out of his
franchises or freehold, unless he be duly brought to answer, and
be forejudged by course of law; and if anything be done to the
contrary, it shall be redressed, and holden for none.

So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property,
that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for
the general good of the whole community. If a new road, for
instance, were to be made through the grounds of a private person,
it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the public; but the
law permits no man, or set of men, to do this without consent of
the owner of the land. In vain it may be urged, that the good of the
individual ought to yield to that of the community; for it would be
dangerous to allow any private man, or even any public tribunal,
to be the judge of this common good, and to decide whether it be
expedient or no. Besides, the public good is in nothing more
essentially interested, than in the protection of every individual’s
private rights, as modeled by the municipal law. In this, and
similar cases the legislature alone, can, and indeed frequently does,
interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it
interpose and compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of
his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full
indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained.
The public is now considered as an individual, treating with an
individual for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to
oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price;
and even this is an exertion of power, which the legislature
indulges with caution, and which nothing but the legislature can
perform.

Nor is this the only instance in which the law of the land has
postponed even public necessity to the sacred and inviolable
rights of private property. For no subject of England can be
constrained to pay any aids or taxes, even for the defence of the
realm or the support of government, but such as are imposed by
his own consent, or that of his representatives in parliament. By
the statute … it is provided, that the king shall not take any aids or
tasks, but by the common assent of the realm. … No talliage or
aid shall be taken without the assent of the archbishops, bishops,
earls, barons, knights, burgesses, and other freemen of the land:
and … the prelates, ears, barons, and commons, citizens,
burgesses, and merchants shall not be charged to make any aid, if
it be not by the common assent of the great men and commons in
parliament. And as this fundamental law had been shamefully
evaded under many succeeding princes, by compulsive loans, and
benevolences extorted without a real and voluntary consent, it was
made an article in the petition of right 3 Car. I, that no man shall
be compelled to yield any gift, loan, or benevolence, tax, or such
like charge, without common consent by act of parliament. And,
lastly, by the statute … it is declared, that levying money for or to
the use of the crown, by pretence of prerogative, without grant of
parliament, or for longer time, or in other manner, than the same
is or shall be granted, is illegal. …

[In the law, one’s property (protected by law) includes what one
receives by gift, grant, or contract by people who are willing and
able to do so with informed and voluntary consent. “Our law
considers marriage … a civil contract.” (Bk 2, ch. 30; Bk 1, ch. 15)]
The absolute rights of man, considered as a free agent, endowed with discernment to know good from evil, and with power of choosing those measures which appear to him to be most desirable, are usually summed up in one general appellation, and denominated the natural liberty of mankind. This natural liberty consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of nature: being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of God.